The Paradoxical Interrelationship of Church and State in Post-Communist Russia:  The Rise and Manifestation of Power via the Prism of LGBTQIA Rights by Zhdanov, Alekcander
  
 
 
 
THE PARADOXICAL INTERRELATIONSHIP OF CHURCH AND STATE IN POST-
COMMUNIST RUSSIA:  THE RISE AND MANIFESTATION OF POWER 
VIA THE PRISM OF LGBTQIA RIGHTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
ALEKCANDER MARKUC ZHDANOV 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A THESIS 
 
Presented to the Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies Program 
and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
Master of Arts 
 
June 2016 
  
ii 
 
 
 
THESIS APPROVAL PAGE 
 
Student:  Alekcander Markuc Zhdanov 
 
Title:  The Paradoxical Interrelationship of Church and State in Post-Communist Russia:  
The Rise and Manifestation of Power via the Prism of LGBTQIA Rights 
 
This thesis has been accepted and approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for 
the Master of Arts degree in the Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies program 
by: 
 
Julie Hessler   Chairperson 
Craig Parsons   Member 
Keith Eddins   Member 
 
and 
 
Scott L. Pratt   Dean of the Graduate School 
 
Original approval signatures are on file with the University of Oregon Graduate School. 
 
Degree awarded June 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2016 Alekcander Markuc Zhdanov 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
iv 
 
 
THESIS ABSTRACT 
 
Alekcander Markuc Zhdanov 
 
Master of Arts 
 
Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies Program 
 
June 2016 
 
Title:  THE PARADOXICAL INTERRELATIONSHIP OF CHURCH AND STATE IN 
POST-COMMUNIST RUSSIA:  THE RISE AND MANIFESTATION OF POWER VIA 
THE PRISM OF LGBTQIA RIGHTS 
 
 
The Russian Orthodox Church is seeking to reestablish a leadership role in the 
spiritual health of the citizenry in post-Communist Russia via a concerted effort to forge 
an alliance with the Russian government, regardless of the secular constitution.  
Commencing with perceived preferential legislation, the Church has risen to heightened 
influence that is subsequently being used to disenfranchise non-traditional sexual 
communities.  This paper offers an extensive cross-examination of legislation and 
intersectionality that highlights the incongruities of this alliance via international, federal, 
and religious documents, legal case law, polling data and more to purport that the Church 
encompasses a higher degree of complexity than was previously assumed, including non-
religious self-identification.  Ultimately, this paper concludes that the Church, in its current 
form, functions more as an agency of the State than as a religious entity.  Lastly, this paper 
neither defends nor anathematizes the merits of any theological tenet. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
v 
 
CURRICULUM VITAE 
 
 
NAME OF AUTHOR:  Alekcander Markuc Zhdanov 
 
 
 
GRADUATE AND UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED: 
 
 University of Oregon, Eugene, OR 
 The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX 
 Austin Community College, Austin, TX 
 University of Nebraska, Lincoln, NE 
 East Central University, Ada, OK 
 
 
 
DEGREES AWARDED:  
 
 Master of Arts in Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies 
  University of Oregon, June 2016 
 Bachelor of Arts in Geography; Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies 
  The University of Texas at Austin, May 2014 
  With High Honors 
 
 
 
AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST: 
 
 Russian Government, Religion, History, Geography 
 Human Rights 
 LGBTQIA Rights 
 
 
 
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE 
 
 Russian Language Instructor, University of Oregon, 2014-2016 
 International Flight Purser, American Airlines, Inc., 1999-2011 
 
 
 
GRANTS, AWARDS, HONORS: 
 
 Graduate Teaching Fellowship, Russian, University of Oregon, 2014-2016 
 
  
vi 
 
PUBLICATIONS 
 
Zhdanov, Alekcander. 2014. “The Dichotomous Reign of Pope Pius XII from 1939-1945: 
Representative of God or Defender of Catholicism.” Linguistic, Cultural and 
Educational Issues of Roma, 180-195.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
vii 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
I wish to express sincere appreciation to Professors Parsons and Eddins for their 
unwavering support and assistance in the preparation of this manuscript and throughout 
my academic career.  In addition, special thanks are due to Dr. Julie Hessler, whose 
exceptional knowledge and guidance provided the foundation upon which to construct 
this crowning work.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
viii 
 
 
DEDICATION 
 
This thesis is dedicated to my loving husband, Mr. Robert “Ian” Bess, for without 
his unquestioning and steadfast love and support, this work would not have materialized. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
ix 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Chapter Page 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  ......................................................................................  1 
 
The Multi-Facets of ‘Religion’  ...................................................................  7 
 
II. RISE OF THE CHURCH AND STATE ALLIANCE  ...............................  9 
The 1997 Law  .............................................................................................  9 
     Principle Violations  ...............................................................................  14 
     Exclusive Benefits to a Religious ‘Organization’  ..................................  18 
     Violation of Substantive Rights  .............................................................  24 
     Chief Proponents and Their Rationale  ...................................................  28 
     Reactions by Prominent Scholars  ..........................................................  31 
     Russian Legal Case Law  ........................................................................  33 
Unconstitutional Exclusive Benefits to the Church  ....................................  37 
III. MANIFESTATION OF THE CHURCH AND STATE ALLIANCE  .......  40 
Specificities of the ‘Gay Propaganda’ Law  ................................................  42 
Ramifications, Rationale, and Reactions  ....................................................  46 
Intersectionality of Church and State on Societal Issues  ............................  56 
The Ineffectiveness of ‘Soft Power’  ...........................................................  59 
IV. CONCLUSION  ...........................................................................................  64 
 
REFERENCES CITED  ...............................................................................  68 
 
SUPPLEMENTAL REFERENCES  ...........................................................  77 
 
 
 
 
  
x 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table Page 
1. Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Translations  ...........................................................  xi 
2. Relevant International Treaties of the Russian Federation  .....................................  66 
3. International Treaty Terminology  ...........................................................................  67 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
xi 
 
 
 
TABLE 1: 
 
Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Translations 
 
 
Church Russian Orthodox Church 
State Government of the Russian Federation 
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights 
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights 
ICCPR 
International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 
1990 Law 
Law of the Russian Soviet Federative 
Socialist Republic on Freedom of Worship 
1997 Law 
Law on Freedom of Conscience and 
Religious Associations 
‘Gay Propaganda’ Law 
Law on the Protection of Children from 
Information Liable to be Injurious to their 
Health and Development 
LGBTQIA 
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, 
Queer/Questioning, Intersexual, 
Asexual/Ally Communities 
Translations by, or edited by, Alekcander Zhdanov, unless otherwise specified 
 
 
 
  
1 
 
CHAPTER I: 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
The imbroglio over constitutional interpretations and the ramifications of 
the intersectionality of the religious and political domain in the Russian Federation 
is creating cause for concern in the Western world, as Russia seeks to emerge from 
its authoritarian past.  The amount of scholarship within the social sciences has only 
just begun to research the intersectionality of politics and religion, and what has 
previously been written, has almost exclusively been devoted to the study of Islam 
in a post-9/11 world.  As “religions are (re)entering the public sphere not only to 
‘defend their traditional turf,’ but also to ‘participate in the very struggles to define 
. . . private and public spheres,”’ many politicians and theologians are advocating 
from a perceived position of divine authority to represent their constituencies.1  A 
prominent example of this philosophy of gaining significant power and influence 
to the detriment of others commenced with the 1997 Russian Law on Freedom of 
Conscience and Religious Associations [hereafter 1997 Law],2 which sought to 
thwart the influx of foreign missionaries and set up a tiered system of religious 
hierarchy, with the Russian Orthodox Church [hereafter Church] as a dominant 
beneficiary, while simultaneously protecting the cultural, religious and historical 
                                                          
1 Hesli, Vicki L., Ebru Erdem, Arthur Miller, and William Reisinger. "The Patriarch and the 
President: Religion and Political Choice in Russia." Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet 
Democratization, 1999: 42. 
 
2 Российская Федерация. "Федеральный закон от 26 сентября 1997 г. N 125-ФЗ "О свободе 
совести и о религиозных объединениях" (с изменениями и дополнениями)." Сайт 
Конституции Российской Федерации. 1997. http://constitution.garant.ru/act/right/171640/. 
(Translations by Xenia Dennen and Larry Uzzell, provided by Keston Institute). 
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traditions of self-identity and expression in the country.  One of the many 
demographical groups to suffer the effects of marginalization and 
disenfranchisement of this law were, and are, the non-traditional sexual minority 
populations [hereafter LGBTQIA].  The banality of favoritism and 
unconstitutionality that is aiding in the obstruction of Russia’s emergence from its 
turbulent, Communist past cannot easily be dismissed, if the country seeks to enter 
into and celebrate its pluralistic and heterogeneous society in the twenty-first 
century.  A post-authoritarian system can “no longer base itself on the 
unadulterated, brutal, and arbitrary application of power, eliminating all 
expressions of nonconformity,”3 if democratic ideals, such as “plurality, diversity, 
independent self-constitution, and self-organization,”4 are respected and used as a 
foundation for further democratic development.  ‘Living the truth’ via an ‘authentic 
existence’ is the only option for challenging the status quo, regardless of the 
expected consequences. 5   However, the practical application of this principle 
requires more than simple verbiage and belief. 
In order to understand the unique partnership between the Church and the 
Russian government [hereafter State], it is imperative to acknowledge the rhetoric 
from prominent officials within their respective domains.  Then-Metropolitan Kirill 
and Later-Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia stated:  
[O]ur church is in no way striving to receive the status of a state church . . . 
On the other hand, our study of past experience has convinced us of the 
                                                          
3 Havel, Vaclav. "The Power of the Powerless." In Citizens Against the State in Central-Eastern 
Europe, edited by John Keane, 125-214. London: Hutchinson, 1978: 127. 
 
4 Ibid., 134. 
 
5 Ibid., 148. 
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necessity of constructing a partnership [my emphasis] with the State, based 
on mutual beneficial cooperation in the interests of society as a whole.  Such 
a partnership would presuppose the conclusion of agreements which would 
create the proper legal foundation for the Church’s social ministry.6 
 
The Church wants an ‘alliance’ with the State, including all of the favored benefits 
and privileges that the State will grant, while occupying the role of de facto state 
religion without the official title.  The other traditional religions of Russia include 
Judaism, Islam, and Buddhism and are technically privy to similar rights afforded 
in the 1997 Law to the Church, but the ultimate authority has been relegated to local 
authorities and is subject to interpretation.  Therefore, the Church succeeded in its 
mission via the enactment of the 1997 Law.  Lawrence Uzzell correctly asserted 
that “the Western missionaries themselves have a lot to answer for, for their 
insensitivity in going into a place that has had thousands of years of Christianity . . 
.”7  Yet regardless of guilt and negligence on all sides, the 1997 Law appears to be 
unconstitutional as it contradicts a plethora of official government verbiage, found 
within the 1993 Russian Constitution. 
 The entanglement of politics and religion did not originate in Russia or any 
other modern nation-state.  Aristotle wrote that “A tyrant must put on the 
appearance of uncommon devotion to religion.  Subjects are less apprehensive of 
illegal treatment from a ruler whom they consider god-fearing and pious.  On the 
other hand, they do less easily move against him, believing that he has the gods on 
his side” and Seneca the Younger has been quoted as stating that, “Religion is 
                                                          
6 Blitt, Robert C. "How to Entrench a De Facto State Church in Russia: A Guide in Progress." 
2008 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 707, 2008: 769. 
 
7 Ibid., 733. 
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regarded by the common people as true, by the wise as false, and by rulers as 
useful.”8  With the Islamic, Buddhist, and Jewish nations excluded for simplicity, 
present-day Europe, likewise, is host to various countries that have a close church 
and state intersectionality encoded in their constitutions.  These include: (1) Roman 
Catholicism in Liechtenstein and Malta; (2) Orthodoxy in Greece and Bulgaria; (3) 
Anglicanism in England; (4) Lutheranism in Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Finland, 
and Sweden; (5) Calvinism in Scotland; and (6) unique religious tenet formulations 
in France and Hungary.  Thus, in theory, a close interrelationship of church and 
state in Russia is not distressing or unfamiliar.   
In the early Soviet era, the State was equally influential concerning Church 
actions by aiding in the creation of a pro-Kremlin Orthodox Renovationist 
movement.  Within this sect of the Orthodox Church, ‘Red Priests’ (Orthodox 
priests who had a greater allegiance for the State than the Church, often times with 
simultaneous KGB affiliations) aided the Russian State in the goal of destabilizing 
the entire Orthodox Church; ultimately, they were later disbanded by the State when 
their usefulness was no longer needed. 9   Joseph Stalin later capitalized on an 
opportune time to reestablish the Moscow Patriarchate in 1943 in the midst of the 
Great Patriotic War, for he correctly believed that the Soviet citizenry would not 
fight for him or the State, but would fight for Mother Russia and the Church.10  
                                                          
8 Cline, Austin. "Aristotle on Politics & Religion: Tyrants Need to be God-Fearing and Pious." 
Atheism. March 2, 2016. http://atheism.about.com/od/weeklyquotes/a/aristotle01.htm. 
 
9 Roslof, Edward E. Red Priests: Renovationism, Russian Orthodoxy, and Revolution, 1905-1946. 
Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 2002. 
 
10 Miner, Steven Merritt. Stalin's Holy War: Religion, Nationalism, and Alliance Politics, 1941-
1945. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003. 
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Lastly, Dunlop wrote that the Church was used as an ‘empire-saving’ institution 
during the early days of the newly-constructed Russian Federation, and would 
ultimately be used as the foundation for a reconstitution of the former Soviet Union, 
if ever that should materialize.11  Admittedly, these are but a few of the many 
examples of Church and State intersectionality in the past.  
As a foundational statement on which to frame the pressing argument for a 
Church and State alliance, former Patriarch Aleksey II was succinct.  He stated that 
“Russia came to exist as a state on the basis of the Orthodox religion . . . and it is 
on the basis of the Orthodox religion that the Motherland can regain its 
magnificence.”12  The issue is not whether or not this statement is true, but which 
defining characteristics of Orthodoxy will be used to accomplish this goal.  As 
history so accurately records, religion has always had a corruptive element which 
has been used as a catalyst to attain power and to control the masses.  The 
environment in the Russian Federation is a modern manifestation of such 
corruption, which will need a catalyst of new methods of pressure in order to 
achieve a transformation. 
This paper elucidates the differences in Russian Orthodoxy between 
divinely inspired religious Orthodoxy and a nationalist self-identifying 
cultural/secular Orthodoxy that can be used as demographical category, via a 
detailed analysis of the Russian Constitution, European Union and United Nations 
                                                          
11 Dunlop, John B. The Russian Orthodox Church as an 'Empire-Saving' Institution. Vol. 3, in The 
Politics of Religion in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, 15-78. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 
1995. 
 
12Fagan, Geraldine. Believing in Russia - Religious Policy After Communism. New York: 
Routledge, 2013: 199.  
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documents, international case law, opinion polling data and more.  This paper 
ultimately purports that the present-day Church hierarchy is essentially an 
asymmetrical political construct and agency of the State.  The structure of this paper 
rests on the foundation of an era for the creation of increased State power via the 
legitimating mechanism of the Church, and then followed by an example of the 
manifestation of that power utilizing the LGBTQIA community and the passage 
and implementation of the Law on the Protection of Children from Information 
Liable to be Injurious to their Health and Development of 2013 [hereafter ‘Gay 
Propaganda’ Law].  This paper argues that the church structure is based not on 
“gospel values of freedom, truth and enlightenment, but on fear, authoritarianism 
and the promotion of nationalism under the guise of religious zeal.  This kind of 
fake patriotic religion deifies the State and gives divine sanction to a nation’s 
imperialism.”13  As Samuel P. Huntington wrote and I posit in this paper, “[i]n 
Islam, God is Caesar; in China and Japan, Caesar is God; in Orthodoxy, God is 
Caesar’s junior partner.”14 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 Woods, Mark. "How the Russian Orthodox Church is Backing Vladimir Putin's New World 
Order." Christian Today. March 3, 2016. 
http://www.christiantoday.com/article/how.the.russian.orthodox.church.is.backing.vladimir.putins.
new.world.order/81108.htm. 
 
14 Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1996: 70. 
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The Multi-Facets of ‘Religion’ 
 
 
 
The concept of ‘religion’ has not been succinctly defined in the social 
sphere or within the realm of international law.  Lemert wrote, that “Since World 
War II, the sociology of religion has unnecessarily confined itself to a sociography 
of church religion.” 15   This has systematically excluded many religions that 
question the value of obligatory beliefs and practices.16  In the twenty-first century, 
religion has been defined as “the understanding of the world we live in and its 
understanding of what makes a person a human, a hero, or a villain.”17  However, 
the scholarly discourse of what is and what is not a religion strengthened with the 
work of Robert Neelly Bellah, who challenged the importance and mandatory 
concept of a supernatural entity within religion and the possibility of its existence 
in the secular world.18  To some adherents of religious faith, the only acceptable 
definition must address tenets of redemption and salvation.  Ultimately, though, 
religion came to represent “all of the disproved, unproven, and unprovable 
assumptions and beliefs about reality that were left behind after science and 
rationality had extracted their understanding of the world,”19 whether or not we are 
                                                          
15 Lemert, Charles C. "Defining Non-Church Religion." Review of Religious Research, 1975: 186. 
 
16 Rodrigues, Hillary, and John S. Harding. Introduction to the Study of Religion. New York, NY: 
Routledge - Taylor & Francis Group, 2009, 2. 
 
17 Hunt, Robert. "No Freedom from Religion." Patheos. October 18, 2012. 
http://www.patheos.com/blogs/roberthunt/2012/10/no-freedom-from-religion/. 
 
18 Bellah, Robert N. "Civil Religion in America." Daedalus, Summer 1988: 97-118. 
 
19 Rodrigues and Harding, 19. 
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speaking of atheism by Febvre, the philosophy of Descartes, or the childish nature 
of religion by Feuerbach.20 
 Within international law, the term ‘religion’ is equally undefined, even with 
the existence of clauses which reference its freedom in official governmental 
documents.21  Religion exists as ‘belief,’ which “pertains to the convictions that 
people hold regarding such matters as God, truth, or doctrines of faith,” and 
simultaneously, religion exists as ‘identity,’ which “emphasizes affiliation with a 
group . . . something akin to a family, ethnicity, race, or nationality . . . and is 
something into which people believe they are born rather than something to which 
they convert after a process of study, prayer, or reflection.”22   
It is upon these bifurcated distinctions that this work is founded and framed, 
in order to explicate the pivotal moment in history when the Church rose to 
influential prominence in post-Communist Russia, and to expound on the 
manifestation of this power via the marginalization and disenfranchisement of the 
LGBTQIA communities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
20 Oesterdiekhoff, Georg W. "What is Religion and How is it Explainable?" Richard Dawkins 
Foundation for Reason & Science. November 21, 2014. https://richarddawkins.net/2014/11/what-
is-religion-and-how-is-it-explainable/. 
 
21 Gunn, T. Jeremy. "The Complexity of Religion and the Definition of "Religion" in International 
Law." Harvard Human Rights Journal (Harvard Law School) 16 (2003): 190. 
 
22 Ibid., 201. 
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CHAPTER II: 
 
THE RISE OF THE CHURCH AND STATE ALLIANCE 
 
The 1997 Law 
 
 
A significant indication of the rise to power and influence by the Church 
was the passage and implementation of the Boris Yeltsin-era 1997 Law on Freedom 
of Conscience and Religious Associations.23  The 1997 Law legally and exclusively 
grants a plethora of rights and privileges, such as financial and tax benefits, the 
right to own and operate private property, perform charitable activities, permission 
to disseminate and receive religious information, and more to registered religious 
‘organizations,’ that creates tension with observers.24  The passage and enactment 
of this law repealed the Mikhail Gorbachev- and Soviet-era 1990 Law of the 
Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic on Freedom of Worship [hereafter 
1990 Law], which insured all religious associations were to be equal before the law 
without any preferential treatment from the State.25  The 1997 Law appears to 
violate established international law to which the Russian Constitution grants 
deference, as stated in Article 15, Paragraph 4:  “the universally-recognized norms 
of international law and international treaties and agreements of the Russian 
Federation shall be a component part of its legal system.  If an international treaty 
                                                          
23 Российская Федерация, 1997 Law.   
 
24 Ibid. 
 
25 СССР. "Law of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic on Freedom of Worship 
(25/10/1990)”. Uniroma3.  October 25, 1990. http://host.uniroma3.it/progetti/cedir/cedir/Lex-
doc/Ru_l_1990.pdf., Art. 5. 
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or agreement of the Russian Federation fixes other rules than those envisaged by 
law, the rules of the international agreement shall be applied.”26 
 The 1990 Law, signed by Mikhail Gorbachev, the President of the Soviet 
Union and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union, stated that, “All religions and religious associations shall be 
equal before the laws of the state.  No religion or religious association shall enjoy 
any advantages or be subjected to any restrictions relative to others.  In matters of 
freedom of worship and belief the state shall be neutral, that is shall not favor any 
religion or outlook.”27  In contrast, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed the 1997 
Law which affords the Russian Orthodox Church [hereafter Church] an elevated 
status in the preamble of the document.  It reads that, “. . . recognizing a special 
role of the Orthodox Church in the history of Russia, the formation and 
development of its spirituality and culture . . .”28  Whether or not the intent was to 
grant special rights and privileges to the Church, the bulk of the law provides 
evidence that cannot easily be dismissed as anything other. 
The 1997 Law distinguishes two different types of religious associations: 
‘groups’ and ‘organizations.’  A ‘group’ is defined as a voluntary association of 
citizens, formed for the goals of joint confession and dissemination of their faith, 
carrying out its activities ‘without required state registration’ 29  and without 
                                                          
26 Российская Федерация. "Конституция Российской Федерации". Constitution. 2015. 
http://www.constitution.ru/index.htm. 
 
27 CCCP, 1990 Law, Article 10. 
 
28 Российская Федерация, 1997 Law, Preamble. 
 
29 United States Department of State. 2010. Russia. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State. 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171717.pdf. 
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obtaining the legal capabilities of a legal personality; an entity where citizens are 
to inform the local authorities about its creation and the beginning of its activities; 
and an entity that has the right to conduct worship services, to carry out religious 
rituals and ceremonies.30  An ‘organization’ is defined as a free association of 
citizens, formed with the goals of joint confession and dissemination of their faith, 
and registered as a legal personality in accordance with practice established law; an 
entity “consists of ten or more members or followers who are at least 18 years old 
and who are permanently residing in one locality; has been functioning in the 
Russian Federation for no fewer than 15 years; and has been formed by a central 
religious organization.31  The creation of a new ‘organization’ is complex, for it 
must have confirmation from the organs of the local government that it has existed 
for no less than 15 years on the said territory, or confirmation from a centralized 
religious organization of the same creed that it forms part of its structure.32  At the 
time of implementation of the 1997 Law, a religious institution must have operated 
within Russia or the former Soviet Union since 1982, or has operated as a branch 
of a centralized religious organization.  The Russian Orthodox Church qualifies for 
the favored ‘organization’ classification, but so do many other faith-based 
associations.  Per the Russian Ministry of Defense,33 as of January 1, 2004, the 
number of registered religious ‘organizations’ included: 
                                                          
  
30 Российская Федерация, 1997 Law, Article 7.   
 
31 Ibid., Article 8. 
 
32 Ibid., Article 9.1. 
 
33 Filatov, Sergei and Roman Lunkin. March 2006. "Statistics on Religion in Russia: The Reality 
Behind the Figures." Religion, State, & Society (Routledge) 34(1): 44. 
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 Russian Orthodox Church  .............................................  10,767 
 Old Believers  ................................................................  267 
 Roman Catholics  ...........................................................  235 
 Armenian Apostolic  ......................................................  57 
 Pentecostals  ...................................................................  1460 
 Baptists and Evangelicals  .............................................  1571 
 Seventh-Day Adventists ................................................  620 
 Lutherans .......................................................................  202 
 Methodists  .....................................................................  98 
 Jews  ...............................................................................  256 
 Muslims .........................................................................  3397 
 Buddhists .......................................................................  180 
 
The U.S. Department of State recorded, again per the Russian Ministry of Defense 
in 2010, that there were 23,494 registered organizations in Russia, of which 54% 
were affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church.34  Deductive reasoning suggests 
that these are favored religious ‘organizations,’ because, as aforementioned, a 
religious ‘group’ is not required to register with the State, unless attempting to 
transition to the favored status. 
 Classification status is paramount.  The transition process for a religious 
‘group’ to a religious ‘organization’35 is not only possible but fairly benign from a 
legal perspective.  A religious ‘group’ maintains the status of a juridical person 
while reregistering each year until the 15 year mandatory period has elapsed.36  A 
religious ‘organization’ can also be bifurcated as well, between ‘local’ and 
‘centralized,’ with the latter being comprised of three ‘local’ organizations. 37  
                                                          
 
34 U.S. Department of State, “Russia.” 
 
35 Российская Федерация, 1997 Law, Article 7.2. 
 
36 Ibid., Article 27.3. 
 
37 Ibid., Article 8.  
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However, the State and courts do not mandate an unbiased interpretation of the 
1997 Law; thus, arbitrary enforcement of regulations has become the norm. 
 The aforementioned list, along with the traditional religions of Judaism, 
Islam, and Buddhism as proclaimed in the Russian Constitution, all equally qualify 
as a religious ‘organization’ via the 1997 Law statutes, but again, enforcement and 
interpretation of the law has been consigned to the local authorities without a clear 
and concise mandate from the federal level.  
 In order to determine whether or not the 1997 Law creates an 
unconstitutional alliance between the Church and State, it is prudent to begin the 
process with elucidation of key components of the 1993 Russian Constitution, 
beginning with the Preamble.  It reads:   
We, the multinational people of the Russian Federation, united by a 
common fate on our land, establishing human rights and freedoms, civic 
peace and accord, preserving the historically established state unity, 
proceeding from the universally recognized principles of equality and self-
determination of peoples, revering the memory of ancestors who have 
conveyed to us the love for the Fatherland, belief in the good and justice, 
reviving the sovereign statehood of Russia and asserting the firmness of its 
democratic basic, striving to ensure the well-being and prosperity of Russia, 
proceeding from the responsibility for our Fatherland before the present and 
future generations, recognizing ourselves as part of the world community, 
adopt the Constitution of the Russian Federation.38 
 
By confirming the rights of the individual to freedom of religion and conscience, 
personal equality, proclaiming that Russia is a secular state, codifying the historical 
significance of certain religions, and aspiring to promote mutual tolerance, the 
Preamble of the Russian constitution appears to render the 1997 Law 
                                                          
38 Российская Федерация, "Конституция.”  
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unconstitutional.  However, the violations of this law run much deeper and conflict 
with more than simply an introductory phrase of the federal document. 
 
Principle Violations 
 
 
 
This law is seemingly unconstitutional when held against the standard of 
the Russian Constitution, as well as being in direct conflict with two other human 
rights conventions, to which the Russian Federation has pledged to adhere.39  The 
Oxford Dictionary defines ‘unconstitutional’ as “not in accordance with a political 
constitution . . . or with procedural rules.”40  For further clarification, a specific law, 
or article/section thereof, is deemed unconstitutional when it cannot simultaneously 
exist in conjunction with the established article/sections of a constitution, creating 
an impossible scenario when both are deemed as correct and enforceable.  Article 
15, Paragraph 4 of the Russian Constitution reads that the universally-recognized 
norms of international law and international treaties and agreements of the Russian 
Federation shall be a component and part of its legal system.  If an international 
treaty or agreement of the Russian Federation establishes other rules than those 
envisaged by law, the rule of the international agreement shall be applied.  The two 
international agreements in question include the International Covenant on Civil 
                                                          
39 Ibid., Article 15.4. 
 
40 Oxford Dictionary. 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/unconstitutional   
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and Political Rights [hereafter ICCPR],41 and the 1950 European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [hereafter ECHR],42 
as well as legal case law from the European Court of Human Rights [hereafter 
ECtHR].43  These violations include the right of equality, or non-discrimination; 
the freedom of thought, conscience, and belief (or religion); the freedom of 
expression; and, the freedom of association.  In all, the violations are difficult to 
discount. 
 To illuminate these violations, it is imperative to begin the analysis with the 
1993 Russian Constitution.  The federal document declares that it shall have 
supreme juridical force, direct application and shall be used on the whole territory 
of the Russian Federation.  Laws and other legal acts adopted in the Russian 
Federation shall not contradict the Constitution of the Russian Federation.  This is 
roughly equivalent, although not identical, to the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution, which reads that “this Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”44   
                                                          
41 United Nations. "International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights." United Nations Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights. March 23, 1976. 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx. 
 
42 ECHR. European Convention on Human Rights. June 1, 1950. 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf. 
 
43 ECtHR. European Court of Human Rights. 2016. 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=home&c=.  
 
44 United States. The Constitution of the United States. Malta, ID: National Center for 
Constitutional Studies, 2012, Article VI, Paragraph 2. 
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 Additionally, the Russian Constitution must be consistent with international 
human rights standards, as “state protection of the rights and freedoms of man and 
citizen shall be guaranteed in the Russian Federation” and “everyone shall be free 
to protect his rights and freedoms by all means not prohibited by law.” 45  
Additionally, “the universally-recognized norms of international law and 
international treaties and agreements of the Russian Federation shall be a 
component part of its legal system.  If an international treaty or agreement of the 
Russian Federation establishes other rules than those envisaged by law, the rules of 
the international agreement shall be applied.”46  Continuing, Article 17, Paragraphs 
1-3 read: 
1. In the Russian Federation recognition and guarantees shall be provided 
for the rights and freedoms of man and citizen according to the 
universally recognized principles and norms of international law and 
according to the present Constitution.   
2. Fundamental human rights and freedoms are inalienable and shall be 
enjoyed by everyone from the day of birth.   
3. The exercise of rights and freedoms of man and citizen shall not violate 
the rights and freedoms of other peoples.47 
  
Within this framework, all religious ‘organizations’ should be a beneficiary of the 
rights and privileges of the 1997 Law; however, due to local interpretation and bias, 
the Church receives more benefits than most.     
                                                          
 
45 Российская Федерация Constitution, Article 45.1,2. 
 
46 Ibid., Article 15.4. 
 
47 Ibid., Article 17.1,2,3. 
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 Equality.  The Russian Constitution,48 the ECHR,49 and the ICCPR50 all 
fundamentally declare the same idea that all people shall be equal before the law 
and that the State is the guarantor of such.  These declarations are in addition to the 
widely known and accepted Universal Declaration of Human Rights,51 which was 
proclaimed at the United Nations General Assembly in Paris on December 10, 
1948, as General Assembly resolution 217, of which the Soviet Union was a 
member of the formulating commission, but abstained in the final voting process 
and was never ratified; however, the UN Declaration of Human Rights was 
subsequently divided into two different documents, the ICCPR and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights [ICESCR], which 
the Soviet Union later signed and ratified both documents (see Tables 1 and 2).  
More precisely, the ECtHR held that “a distinction based essentially on a difference 
in religion alone is not acceptable.”52  The ICCPR similarly proclaims that the law 
shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective 
protection against discrimination on any grounds of various demographics 
including religion. 53   The Russian Constitution, itself, is far more explicit 
                                                          
48 Ibid., Article 19.1,2. 
 
49 ECHR, Article 14. 
 
50 ICCPR, Article 26. 
 
51 United Nations. "The Universal Declaration of Human Rights." United Nations. December 10, 
1948. http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/. 
 
52 Hoffmann v. Austria. 255 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 61 (ECtHR, 1993).  The case involved a 
divorcee who converted to the Jehovah’s Witnesses, and wanted sole legal and physical custody of 
her children, away from her Roman Catholic ex-husband. 
 
53 ICCPR, Art. 26.  This prohibition of discrimination includes a “non-derogation clause” for use 
in times of national emergency, and defined as “a provision in a treaty that allows the signator to 
refuse to comply with certain provisions,” per USLegal.com. 
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concerning equality, as it reads that “in the Russian Federation ideological diversity 
shall be recognized, no state or obligatory ideology may be established as one, . . . 
public associations shall be equal before the law, and the creation and activities of 
public associations whose aims and actions are aimed at a forced change of the 
fundamental principles of the constitutional system and at violating the integrity of 
the Russian Federation, at undermining its security, at setting up armed units, and 
at instigating social, racial, national and religious strife shall be prohibited.”54  
Immediately following, the Russian Constitution makes powerful proclamations 
that “The Russian Federation is a secular state, no state or obligatory religion may 
be established, and religious associations shall be separate from the State and shall 
be equal before the law.”55  Therefore, evidence suggests that the 1997 Law appears 
to be unconstitutional by both the standards and declarations of the Russian 
Constitution, and by the international treaties of which it has deferred.    
 
Exclusive Benefits to a Religious ‘Organization’ 
 
 
 
 A plethora of benefits are afforded to any religious ‘organization’ based 
upon the legality of the 1997 Law.  However, these benefits continue to be 
arbitrarily and discriminately provided.  The verbiage of the 1997 Law does not 
support the biased approach for the Church, as they receive certain benefits while 
                                                          
 
54 Российская Федерация, Constitution, Article 13.1-5. 
 
55 Ibid., Article 14.1,2. 
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other religious ‘organizations’ do not.  While the following is not fully enumerated, 
it clearly establishes the discriminatory actions and bias of local authorities for the 
Orthodox Church.  Additional, and very prominent benefits that were allocated to 
the Church, solidified upon the spirit of the 1997 Law, will be addressed in a later 
section. 
Financial Benefits and Taxes.  Per the 1997 Law, a religious 
‘organization’ exclusively benefits from tax-exemption.  However, reality differs 
from established law. The 1997 Law declares that the State “shall effect regulation 
in granting to religious organizations tax and other exemptions, extend financial, 
material and other assistance to religious organizations in the restoration, 
maintenance and protection of buildings and projects being monuments of history 
and culture as well as in arranging the teaching of general educational subjects at 
educational establishments set up by religious organizations as is envisaged under 
the laws of the Russian Federation on education.”56  Thus, the Church as a religious 
‘organization’ is tax-exempt, and additionally, receives money from the State for 
religious education; accordingly, this demonstrates unconstitutional bias and 
privilege to the Church, as some religious ‘organizations’ must pay taxes.  
 Baptists and Pentecostals congregations are but two of the religious 
‘organizations’ where tax exemption status eludes them.  Igor Nikitin, head of the 
200-member Association of Christian Churches in Russia and prominent 
charismatic leader, said, “It can get quite expensive [the bureaucratic paper trail] . 
. . You must report to the tax inspectorate one a month, for example.  And even if 
                                                          
56 1997 Law, Article 4.3. 
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you don’t owe any tax, you still need to hire an accountant just to fill in all the 
forms properly.”57  If tax exemption was the norm as a religious ‘organization,’ this 
statement would be illogical.  Additionally, Vitaly Vlasenko, Director of External 
Church Relations for the Russian Union of Evangelical Christians-Baptists, stated 
that “it is obvious that government officials . . . are partial to the Orthodox . . . and 
issues of registration, documentation and taxation have become very bureaucratic 
and issues once settled through negotiation with government officials now often 
wind up in court.” 58   Thus, the rights and privileges afforded a religious 
‘organization’ via the 1997 Law are subject to local interpretation.     
 Property Ownership and Operation.  A religious ‘organization’ is 
authorized to own plots of land and buildings, and operate any activity that is 
necessary.  This can include acquired or created properties, via donation or transfer.  
It has the right to own property abroad, and creditors may not institute any 
proceedings against property intended for worship purposes.59   The 1997 Law 
confirmed the authority established in an April 23, 1993 decree from Then-
President Boris Yeltsin, which instructed the government to “to carry out the 
gradual transfer of houses of worship . . . from federal ownership to the ownership 
of or usage by religious organizations.” 60   However, Protestant and Catholic 
                                                          
57 Brown, Frank. 2000. "Russian Pentecostals Have Cautios View of Vladimir Putin." Charisma 
Magazine. May 31. http://www.charismamag.com/site-archives/134-peopleevents/people-
events/34-russian-pentecostals-have-cautios-view-of-vladimir-putin. 
 
58 Allen, Bob. 2008. "Baptists in Russian Town Claim Bureaucrats Restricting Religious 
Freedom." The Baptist Standard. December 1. https://www.baptiststandard.com/news/world/8911-
baptists-in-russian-town-claim-bureaucrats-restricting-religious-freedom. 
 
59 1997 Law, Article 21.1-5. 
 
60 Fagan, Geraldine. 2005. "RUSSIA: Who owns religious property?" Forum 18 News Service. 
August 30. http://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=639 
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communities are continuing to face obstacles concerning ownership of facilities.61  
For example, as of 2005, Catholics had their historical churches in Karelia, Kursk, 
Tatarstan and Tyumen returned to them, but their churches in Irkutsk, Khabarovsk, 
Smolensk and Yaroslavl had not been returned.62  Another example of the blatant 
bias against non-Orthodox religions include hostilities toward the Muslim 
community of the Volga Spiritual Directorate in the Ozinki district, a traditional 
religion in addition to being a religious ‘organization.’  When an Orthodox church 
received donated building materials for a new church, the mosque, when asking for 
similar assistance, was rebuked by the local authorities by stating, “Am I your 
servant, to be finding you roof tiles?  Don’t come to me with such questions 
again.”63  Thus, the 1997 Law is locally interpreted and enforced in the absence of 
a federal mandate.  
 Charitable Activities.  A religious ‘organization’ is permitted to carry out 
charitable activities,64 and has the right to carry out religious rites in health centers 
and hospitals, in children’s homes, in old people’s homes and institutions for the 
handicapped, and in institutions applying sentences of imprisonment for criminal 
offences at the request of the citizens held there in premises specially designated 
by the administration for these purposes. 65  However, non-Orthodox religious 
                                                          
 
61 Fagan, Geraldine. 2005. "RUSSIA: Growing Obstruction to Protestant Church Property 
Ownership." Forum 18 News Service. August 24. 
http://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=637. 
 
62 Fagan, “RUSSIA:  Who owns religious property?” 
 
63 Fagan, “RUSSIA:  Growing Obstruction.” 
 
64 1997 Law, Article 18.1. 
 
65 Ibid., Article 16.3. 
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‘organizations’ are criticized for “combining and indirectly linking their charity 
activity with missionary work,”66 with the chief critics being among the Russian 
Orthodox Church and their officials, espousing “special respect” for Orthodoxy.  
 Permission to Disseminate and Receive Religious Information.  A 
religious ‘organization’ has the right to produce, acquire, export, import and 
distribute religious literature,67 including the authorization to create a mass media.68  
The Church is also permitted to invite foreign citizens to preach and conduct 
religious activities.69 
 Discrimination between Citizens and Non-Citizens.  The 1997 Law 
contains a proforma70 statement that foreigners residing in Russia have the right to 
hold religious beliefs.71  However, the 1990 Law allowed ‘both’ citizens and non-
citizens to found associations for religious activities.72  The 1997 restriction is not 
limited to officially recognized and formal organizations, but also extends to 
‘informal’ operations.73   
                                                          
 
66 МХГ. 2003. "Conditions for the Charitable Activity of Religious Associations in Russia." 
Московская Хельсинская Группа: Старейшая из Ныне Действующих Российская 
Правозащитная Организация. http://www.mhg.ru/english/1F52412. 
 
67 1997 Law, Article 17.1. 
 
68 Ibid., Article 18.2.  
 
69 Ibid., Article 20.2. 
 
70 A Latin phrase defined by Translegal.com, meaning “as a matter of form”.  In practice, the 
phrase usually refers to an act or document which is preliminary or satisfies the minimum 
requirements in a perfunctory manner.  It can though differ in meaning depending on the context. 
 
71 1997 Law, Article 3.1.2. 
 
72 Soviet 1990 Law, Article 4. 
 
73 1997 Law, Article 13.2. 
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 Religious Services Prohibited by Foreign Nationals and Foreign 
Religious Associations.  The 1997 Law proclaims that a representative body of a 
foreign religious organization may not engage in liturgical or other religious 
activities, and will not receive the status of a religious association as established by 
this federal law.74 
 Non-Organization Believers Permitted to Communicate with Foreign 
Believers.  The 1997 Law proclaims that only religious ‘organizations’ have the 
right to establish and maintain international links and contacts, including those for 
the goals of pilgrimages, participation in meetings and other undertakings, for 
receiving religious education, and also they have the right to invite foreign citizens 
for these purposes75  Similarly, only religious ‘organizations’ exclusively possess 
the right to invite foreign citizens for professional purposes, including preaching 
and religious activity in the said organizations in accordance with federal laws.76   
 Other Benefits.  Many other benefits are afforded to a religious 
‘organization,’ to which religious ‘groups’ are excluded.  These benefits are clearly 
outlined in the text of the 1997 Law, but their inclusion would appear superfluous 
for the purpose of this work.77   
 In sum, the presented discourse seemingly and convincingly questions the 
constitutionality of Russian Federal Law No. 125-FZ of September 26, 1997, as it 
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75 Ibid., Article 20.1. 
 
76 Ibid., Article 20.2. 
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establishes a two-tiered system which exclusively benefits a religious 
‘organization,’ of which many religious entities qualify, while often simultaneously 
and unconstitutionally benefiting the Church via favoritism and bias, for the Church 
is but only one of the legally registered religious ‘organizations.’  The freedoms 
and rights, which were guaranteed under the 1990 Soviet Law, were subsequently 
abolished for all Western evangelical and missionary-focused denominations, 
including for the traditional religions of Judaism, Islam, and Buddhism.  Therefore, 
it is derived from the established evidence that the Russian Federation is a de facto 
religious State, governing in direct violation of constitutional law and international 
conventions.   
 
Violation of Substantive Rights 
 
 
 
Freedom of Religion.  In addition to the specific benefits afforded a 
religious ‘organization’ and principle violations through the 1997 Law, there are a 
plethora of rights addressing freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, which 
are detailed in the Russian Constitution,78 ECHR,79 and the ICCPR.80  All three 
                                                          
78 Российская Федерация, Constitution, Article 28:  Everyone shall be guaranteed the freedom of 
conscience, the freedom of religion, including the right to profess individually or together with 
others any religion or to profess no religion at all, to freely choose, possess and disseminate 
religious and other views and act according to them. 
 
79 ECHR, Article 9.1,2: Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this 
right includes   freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community 
with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, 
practice and observance. 
 
80 ICCPR, Article 18.1:  Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion.  This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and 
freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his 
religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. 
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documents clearly state that everyone has the right to these freedoms.  However, 
there are limitations.  The Russian Constitution,81 the ECHR,82 and the ICCPR83 
allow for specific limitations only to the extent required to provide for the 
constitutionality of the country, public safety and order, and such, which puts the 
1997 Law in contradiction with these agreed upon statutes.  Specifically, the 
ECtHR established precedent, as it held that it was illegal for the Greek government 
to impose restrictions on the activities of minority religions, thereby giving favor 
to the Greek Orthodox Church, based upon “historical considerations,” for it did 
not abide by the approved limitation parameters.84  The ECtHR further held in this 
case that “the need to secure true religious pluralism [is] an inherent feature of the 
notion of a democratic society . . .” In the General Committee comments, it is 
written that: 
The fact that a religion is recognized as a State religion or that it is 
established as official or traditional or that its followers comprise the 
majority of the population, shall not result in any impairment of the 
enjoyment of any of the rights under the Covenant, including Articles 18 
and 27, nor in any discrimination against adherents of other religions or 
non-believers.  In particular, certain measures discriminating against the 
latter, such as . . . imposing special restrictions on the practice of other 
faiths, are not in accordance with the prohibition of discrimination based on 
religion or belief and the guarantee of equal protection under Article 26.85 
                                                          
 
81 Российская Федерация, Constitution, Article 55.3. 
 
82 ECHR, Article 9.2. 
 
83 ICCPR, Article 18.3. 
 
84 Manoussakis and Others v. Greece. __ Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), No. 59/1995/565/651 (ECtHR, 
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The ubiquitous nature of a particular faith is a not a justifiable rationale for 
imposing these types of laws.  The 1989 Vienna Concluding Document of the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe directs governments to “foster 
a climate of mutual tolerance and respect between believers of different 
communities as well as between believers and non-believers . . .”86  Additionally, 
the 1981 United Nations Declaration proclaims that religious groups have the right 
to “worship or assemble in connexion with a religion or belief, and to establish and 
maintain places for these purposes.87  And, this right to worship includes doing all 
that is necessary or needed to accomplish this goal, without interference from a 
governing authority.   
 Freedom of Expression.  As with the tenet of religious freedom and choice, 
freedom of expression is likewise afforded the citizenry under the Russian 
Constitution,88 the ECHR,89 and the ICCPR.90  Respectively, limitations exist as 
before mentioned concerning the protection of fundamental principles of the 
                                                          
ICCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, 27 September 1993, Addendum, General Comment No. 22 (48) (art. 
18) [“General Comment”]; and (b) the 1981 United Nations “Declaration on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination based on Religion or Belief,” adopted Jan. 18, 1982, 
GA Res. 55, 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51), U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/55 (1982) [“1981 UN 
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86 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe:  Concluding Document from the Vienna 
Meeting, Nov. 4, 1986-Jan. 17, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 527 [“Vienna Concluding Document”]. 
 
87 United Nations. "Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of 
Discrimination based on Religion or Belief A/RES/36/55." United Nations General Assembly. 
November 25, 1981. http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/36/a36r055.htm, Article 6. 
 
88 Российская Федерация,  Constitution, Article 29.1. 
 
89 ECHR, Article 10.1. 
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constitutional system and more within the State,91 the ECHR,92 and the ICCPR.93  
Manfred Nowak94 (1993) considers freedom of expression to be a subset category 
within freedom of religion, and the same rationales which are used to defend 
religious freedoms are offered mutatis mutandis95 to freedoms of expressions.  The 
ECtHR held more clearly in 1995, by declaring that: 
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a 
democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and each 
individual’s self-fulfillment . . .  [I]t is applicable not only to “information” 
or “ideas” that are favorably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a 
matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb; such 
are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without 
which there is no “democratic society.96 
 
The case for the unconstitutionality of the 1997 Law is steadily strengthening.   
 Freedom of Association.  Of the significant areas of unconstitutionality 
which remain are the freedom of association, which is afforded the citizenry via the 
Russian Constitution, 97  the ECHR, 98  and the ICCPR, 99  with the necessary 
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98 ECHR, Article 11.1. 
 
99 ICCPR, Article 22.1. 
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limitations as mentioned above in the Russian Constitution,100 the ECHR,101 and 
the ICCPR.102  Although absent from most international human rights adjudication, 
except for in the case of trade unions, the ECtHR is consistent when addressing 
issues of a belligerent majority which is attempting to impose its will on a less-
favored minority.  In 1981 the Court held that:  
[P]luralism, tolerance, and broadmindedness are hallmarks of a “democratic 
society.”  Although individual interests must on occasion be subordinated 
to those of a group, democracy does not simply mean that the views of the 
majority must always prevail:  a balance must be achieved which ensures 
the fair and proper treatment of minorities and avoids any abuse of a 
dominant position.103 
 
The argument for unconstitutionality of the 1997 Russian Law appears to be 
apparent, as it contradicts the Russian Constitution and international precedence on 
multiple levels.  
 
Chief Proponents and Their Rationale 
 
 
 
The principal proponents of the 1997 Law in Russia were the Russian 
Orthodox Church, extreme nationalists, and communists.  Particularly, the Church 
began to argue for legislation and protection from the State in order to thwart the 
influx of new religions onto perceived Orthodox territory, as has been 
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aforementioned.  These activities from foreign religions and evangelical 
missionaries considered Russia as virgin territory after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the failure of scientific atheism.  The foreign missionaries began arriving 
in large numbers with considerable financial resources.  Secondarily, to the 
Orthodox hierarchy, these outsiders were considered to be cults from the 
perspective of the Church hierarchy, and consequently, exceptionally dangerous to 
the fabric of Russian society.  In a pronouncement from the Council of Bishops, 
first recorded in Pravoslavnaya Moskva No. 7, the proclamation is clear:    
 
We express our concern in connection with the continuing proselytizing 
activity of protestant false missionaries in Russia and other countries of the 
CIS . . . The council is deeply concerned by the growth of organized pseudo-
Christian and pseudo-religious sects, of neo-pagan communities, occultists 
and devil worshippers . . . The council is extremely troubled by the anti-
Orthodox campaign which is being waged by the followers of these pseudo-
religious organizations and their protectors . . . [T]he leaders of these 
totalitarian sects are in fact depriving their followers of these rights [of 
freedom of conscience] and reacting aggressively to any criticism of their 
activity.  Those who attempt to oppose them are subjected to cruel 
persecution by the sect leaders and their highly-placed protectors, including 
intimidation, psychological pressure, the gathering of incriminating 
information, slander and repeated searches of their property.104 
 
This ideology is exemplified in the mutual State and Church perspective towards 
the Jehovah’s Witnesses.  This religious body continues to struggle with 
registration obstacles, based upon doctrine of refusing the authority of the State.  
Because of such beliefs and non-compliance with State regulations, a recent 
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shipment of religious books and literature was seized at the border by customs’ 
officials.105 
The Church had petitioned for similar legislation to the 1997 Law in the 
early 1990s, but it was ultimately rejected as unnecessary by Yeltsin.  Passage of a 
similar law was accomplished during the constitutional crisis of 1993 and signed 
by acting President Aleksandr Rutskoy, but later annulled after Boris Yeltsin 
regained presidential power.   
Patriarch Aleksey II asserted that the Russian law should recognize “‘our 
own traditions and history’ . . . and that proselytizing should be banned because it 
attempts to ‘entice people who profess the religion of their ancestors into a different 
faith.’”106  The Church has the right to control its territory; however, the evidence 
suggests that sanctioning from the State via the authority of legislation affords a 
bias in a proclaimed secular state.     
 In a country frequently charged with violations concerning human rights, 
Patriarch Aleksey II summoned upon ideas of human rights to defend the Church 
position.  He stated that: 
In seeking to limit this incursion of missionary activity we are often accused 
of violating the right to freedom of conscience and the restriction of 
individual rights.  But freedom does not mean general license . . . [T]he 
aggressive imposition by foreign missionaries of views and principles 
which come from a religious and cultural environment which is strange to 
us, is in fact a violation of both religious and civil rights.107 
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Contrary to the Patriarch’s rhetoric, the 1997 Law does not contain language or 
provisions which address any of the charged accusations on foreign religious 
institutions.  The 1997 Law does, though, require a strict fifteen year mandate of 
existence within Russia on all religious ‘organizations’.108   
 In fact, Gunn argues that “the true purpose of the law was to undercut the 
status of pre-existing religious associations, to undercut missionary activities, to 
restrict dissemination of information about religion, and to buttress the activities of 
the Russian Orthodox Church.”109  Thus, the 1997 Law lacks a legitimate rationale 
for its existence and in reality, acts as a pretext to discriminate via the mechanisms 
of bias.  
 
Reactions by Prominent Scholars 
 
 
 
Many leaders throughout the world and Russia have expressed outrage over 
the inexplicable nature of this law.  Lawrence Uzzell, a well-respected 
representative from the Keston Institute stated that “This [law] would be the 
greatest legislative setback for human rights since the Soviet era”110 and Vladimir 
Ryakhovsky, president of the Christian Legal Center in Moscow, stated that “This 
is interference by the state into the affairs of religious organizations.”111  Lastly, a 
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minister of Moscow’s Evangelical Christian Church, Vladimir Zinchenko stated 
that “with this law signed, you can’t really speak about Russia as a democratic 
country.  If there is no freedom of conscience, that means there is no democracy.”112  
These are but a few of the many negative statements about the 1997 Law from 
within Russia and abroad in the international human rights and religious spheres.  
Yet, the Russian Constitution does not grant individual citizens the right to directly 
petition the Constitutional Court via case law in order to challenge a federal law.113  
In sum, “the thrust of the law exhibited blatant favoritism of the Orthodox Church, 
[while] it reinforced the impression that religious protectionism rather than 
permissible concerns such as public safety, health, constitution order, or rights of 
other people, was the primary motivation for restricting religious liberty.”114 
 Conversely, positive reactions, including from the Church, were not 
surprising.  Father Vsevolod Chaplin offered a red herring, as he stated the Church 
would “suffer a ‘violation of its rights’ if smaller sects were given equal status to 
it,” conflating the situation to drug trafficking with fast religions. 115   Former 
Patriarch Aleksey II steadfastly asserted that “We [the State] must completely ban 
proselytizing.  It is an attempt by unworthy means to lure people to another faith 
from the religion of their ancestors.”116    
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 The 1997 Law creates a constitutionally contradictory, two-tiered religious 
environment within the Russian Federation.  It legally enshrines religious 
‘organizations,’ but in reality, elevates Russian Orthodoxy to a favored position as 
the premier religion with status and benefits. It ultimately excludes legal protections 
of other religious entities, based upon claims of pseudo non-existence and illegal 
operations within the country by the administration via severe restrictions on their 
activities.   
 
Russian Legal Case Law 
 
 
 
The 1997 Law is being used to promote a historical and traditional existence 
of the Church to deny the very aspects of religious worship and activities to non-
Orthodox institutions.  Yet, international human rights law presupposes that states 
— whether or not a democracy or governed by authoritarianism — should not 
employ political power to infringe on universally recognized rights.  However, the 
1997 Law does not parallel the predominant understanding of established 
international human rights law.   
There have been a few legal cases by the Russian Constitutional Court 
which offered holdings that should have subsequently held that the entire 1997 Law 
was unconstitutional.  However, they did not.  These cases included the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses and Christian Church of Praise Case of November 23, 1999, and the 
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Jesuit Case of April 13, 2000.117   In the first case, Article 27.3 annulled the 
requirement for the religious entity to have existed in the country for at least 15 
years prior to the 1997, for they already had registrations and could not have their 
re-registrations denied because of a later law.  In essence, the Court ruled that 
Article 9.1 “provides an alternative to Article 27.”  In the latter case, the 
“foreignness” of the body came into question under Articles 8.3 and 8.4.  Again, 
the Court ruled in favor of already possessed registration and forbade stripping of 
rights already possessed for years.   
 One of the latest manifestations of these legal case laws in Russia involves 
the Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army Case of February 7, 2002, where failure 
to re-register would result in liquidation of all assets.118   The Salvation Army 
claimed that it couldn’t maneuver the plethora of obstacles for timely registration 
and failed to meet the deadline; thus, was subsequently ordered to liquidate.  
Thomas states that “the Court simply ruled that a religious organization registered 
in Russian before 1997 could not be liquidated for failing to jump unnecessary 
bureaucratic hurdles.” 119   The Constitutional Court narrowly held that these 
decisions are only applicable to religious institutions that were present and 
registered within the country prior to 1997; thus, declaring the 1997 Law 
constitutional as a whole. 
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 However, the Russian Constitutional Court has written much about their 
decisions.  It defers to the State, as:   
The government has the right to put certain limits on registration, so that the 
status of a religious organization is not received by any religious association 
automatically, for the purposes of prevention of legalization of sects that 
infringe upon human rights and carry out illegal and criminal activities [and] 
for the purposes of limiting missionary activities (proselytism issue) if they 
are not compatible with the respect for the freedom of thought, conscience, 
and religion of others (e.g. accompanies by offering material and social 
benefits in order to recruit new members, usage of the illegal means of 
persuasion . . . psychological pressure, threat of violence, etc.).120 
 
However, this deference is incompatible with ECtHR case law that directly relates 
to religious associations in Russia. 
 There are four recent individual ECtHR cases that are relevant to the thesis 
of this paper and specifically address Russia.  They include: (1) the Nolan and K v. 
Russia case,121 where the ECtHR held that Russia violated freedom of religion 
tenets with the expulsion of an American missionary of the Unification Church, 
based upon national security concerns; (2) the Kimlya and Others v. Russia case,122 
where the ECtHR ruled ‘against’ the Churches of Scientology in Surgut and 
Nizhnekamsk on their demand for reregistration as a religious association; (3) the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow and Others v. Russia case,123 where the ECtHR 
held against Russia, for violating the rights of Kingdom Hall members over 
complaints of excessive dues, forced literature reading, denial of blood 
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transfusions, proselytizing, and more; and (4) the Krupko and Others v. Russia 
case,124 where again, the ECtHR ruled against Russia for utilizing riot police to raid 
a religious service in progress and detain the religious congregants.  In all, the 
ECtHR has been exceptionally favorable to the established right to freedom of 
religion except for the one inadmissibility case on technical issues and 
simultaneously, while being quite unyielding in their resolve against Russia and the 
1997 Law.   
In disagreement of the 1997 Law, Joseph Brossart comments on the 
legislation, as it “violates the letter and the spirit of the Constitution.”125   He 
continues by asserting that every legal system is “a synthesis of universal notions 
of rights with concrete historical conditions and commitments.”  He posits that the 
Russian Constitutional Court is partly influenced by “historical and cultural norms” 
and cannot rule on the overall and pressing question of constitutionality.    
 In sum, the holdings for the 1997 Law are presently constitutional in the 
opinions of the Russian Constitutional Court, sanctioned by the State and the 
Church in the form of Caesaropapism (the State takes over functions of the supreme 
religious order) and symphonia (an arrangement originating in the Byzantine era in 
the sixth century, when church and state equally shared power), 126  and 
simultaneously,  are incompatible with the holdings from the ECtHR. 
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Unconstitutional Exclusive Benefits to the Church 
 
 There are two prominent benefits afforded to the Church from the State that 
are not based upon the letter of the 1997 Law, but upon the spirit of the law.  These 
benefits are allocated exclusively to the Church; meaning, no other religious entity, 
association, ‘organization,’ or ‘group’ has these rewards. 
 Firstly, the Patriarch of Holy Russia and All Moscow, Kirill II, has moved 
his official residence into the Kremlin Patriarchal chambers, located on the ground 
floor of the Granovitaya Palata.127  Archpriest Vladimir Vigilyansky stated, "His 
Holiness the Patriarch will conduct various meetings in the new residence . . . [and] 
he will meet with the country's leaders there."128  This begs the question as to why 
the need for such a move was warranted, if not for direct access to State officials, 
considering that the Danilov Monastery is the official home of the Church and 
proclaimed residence of the Patriarch, and is located approximately twenty minutes 
to the south of the Kremlin.129 
 Secondly, and most prominently, the State has agreed to show and consult 
with the Church on all legislative work in the future.  A meeting was held between 
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Patriarch Kirill I and two United Russia130 deputies to agree to this tenet,131 just 
prior to Russia’s agreement to proceed with ratification of the European Social 
Contract.132  United Russia Deputy Andrei Isayev told the Patriarch that, in the 
future, the Party “would show the patriarchate the State Duma’s plan for legislative 
work and hold preliminary consultations on all questions that may raise doubts to 
avoid mutual misunderstanding,”133 which certainly provides the rationale for the 
need to have the Patriarch in close proximity to the governing bodies. 
 Simultaneously, various bodies within the Church were created to 
specifically interact with the State and approve legislation.  The Church established 
a department for church-state relations which engages in relationships with 
“legislative bodies, political parties, trade unions . . . and other institutes of the civil 
society in the canonical territory of the Moscow Patriarchate.”134 135  Blitt asserts 
that “from the perspective of the Church, the situation is ideal: its independent 
authority and decision making capacity are preserved intact, and not co-opted by 
the government as under a formal, more unified system of state religion.  Yet at the 
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same time, the Church is able to assert a significant influence on the policy making 
process, not only without regard for Russia’s Constitution, but at the expense of all 
other religious groups in Russia.”136  Ironically, a federal advisory board created 
under federal law for the singular purpose of reviewing draft legislation, “has been 
prevented from performing this task since its establishment in 2005.”137 138 
 Evidence from Former Patriarch Alexey II provides the disturbing rationale 
behind these decisions.   Alexey II stated that, “I remember in 2004 a meeting 
between the President of the Russian Federation and the Council of Bishops of the 
Russian Orthodox Church which was then taking place.  Vladimir Putin said at the 
time that gradually the government is paying back its debts to the Church [my 
emphasis].”139   
Thus, the evidence strongly suggests that although the actual verbiage of 
the 1997 Law did not provide specific benefits for the Church, it was a pivotal 
moment when rapprochement between the State and Church began, upon which 
forthcoming decisions could be formulated in spirit.   
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CHAPTER III: 
 
THE MANIFESTATION OF THE CHURCH/STATE ALLIANCE 
 
 
 
 The previous chapter detailed the manner in which the Church garnered 
increased power and influence within the State structure via legislation and as a 
recipient of preferential bias.  Yet, this accomplishment would be for naught, if not 
for an avenue in which to manifest this newly afforded power.  An important and 
pivotal moment in the history of the Church and State interrelationship was the 
passage and implementation of the 2013 law On the Protection of Children from 
Information Liable to be Injurious to Their Health and Development [hereafter 
‘Gay Propaganda’ Law].140  This is a single law, which collectively amends three 
separate federal laws.  The Church and the State aligned together to address the 
perceived threat on the future survival of the nation-state, to mandate the majority 
stance of heteronormativity across all demographics, and to champion the cause of 
rebuking Western modernity.141  Regardless of the fact that Russia decriminalized 
homosexuality in 1993, and depathologised it in conjunction with the World Health 
Organization’s International Classification of Diseases in 1999, 142  the ‘Gay 
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Propaganda’ Law was seen as the appropriate legislative measure to implement as 
the country was perceived as being under attack from all things Western, 
particularly from Western morals and values, which were diluting and destroying 
Russian society.  Even as President Vladimir Putin made statements concerning the 
absence of any type of infringement on the rights of sexual minorities,143  the 
vaguely written law “effectively prevents the LGBT[QIA] community from 
organizing [and protesting] in public events” and mandates their return to the self-
imposed imprisonment of the closet.144  Elena Klimova, founder of “Children – 
404,” an online referral service to queer teenagers and later charged with violating 
this law, stated that “the law against gay propaganda legitimized violence against 
LGBT[QIA] people, and they now are banning street actions under it. . . . People 
are afraid because they understand that gay propaganda is banned, and even 
mentioning LGBT[QIA] relations is essentially forbidden.”145  
 However, a detailed examination of the law in question, along with its 
specific details and verbiage, is required at this moment before an accurate and 
thorough analysis of the ramifications from the ‘Gay Propaganda’ Law can be 
ascertained. 
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Specificities of the ‘Gay Propaganda’ Law 
 
 
 
 The ‘Gay Propaganda’ Law amends various articles in three different 
federal laws, including in: (1) the 1998 law on principal guarantees of children’s 
rights,146 (2) the 2001 Legal Code,147 and (3) the 2010 law for the protection of 
children.148  The law, in and of itself, is not lengthy, but powerful in rhetoric and 
suggests an appeasement to Church influence.  If enforced exactly as written, it is 
a prolific example of the manifestation of Church and State collaboration within 
Russia.  Thus, as the ramifications of this law are forthcoming, the elucidation of 
the articles in the law are now required.  
 There are five articles in this law, with Articles 4 and 5 only serving 
administrative and logistical functions.  The three primary articles of the ‘Gay 
Propaganda’ Law include: 
1. Article 1, which clarifies the type of values which is being 
addressed, as values “promoting non-traditional sexual values.”149  
Article 1 amends the 2010 law for the protection of children,150 by 
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inserting new text into the article as shown in bold print.  The article 
declares: 
отрицающая семейные ценности, пропагандирующая 
нетрадиционные сексуальные отношения и 
формирующая неуважение к родителям и (или) другим 
членам семьи, 
 
denying family values that promotes unconventional 
sexual relationships and forming disrespect to parents and 
(or) other family members. 
 
2. Article 2, which clarifies similar components as Article 1, by 
amending the 1998 law on principle guarantees of children’s 
rights,151 by inserting “from information promoting non-traditional 
sexual relations.”152  The article declares, with the new text in bold 
print: 
Органы государственной власти Российской Федерации 
принимают меры по защите ребенка от информации, 
пропаганды и агитации, наносящих вред его здоровью, 
нравственному и духовному развитию, в том числе от 
национальной, классовой, социальной нетерпимости, 
от рекламы алкогольной продукции и табачных изделий, 
от пропаганды социального, расового, национального и 
религиозного неравенства, от информации 
порнографического характера, от информации, 
пропагандирующей нетрадиционные сексуальные 
отношения, а также от распространения печатной 
продукции, аудио- и видеопродукции, пропагандирующей 
насилие и жестокость, наркоманию, токсикоманию, 
антиобщественное поведение, 
 
The state authorities of the Russian Federation take measures 
to protect children from information, propaganda and 
agitation harmful to his health, moral and spiritual 
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development, including: from national, class, social 
intolerance; from advertising of alcoholic products and 
tobacco products; from the propaganda of social, racial, 
ethnic and religious inequalities; from information of 
pornographic characteristics; from the information that 
promotes non-traditional sexual relationships; as well as 
from the dissemination of printed materials, audio- and 
video products that promote violence and cruelty, drug 
addiction, substance abuse, antisocial behavior. 
 
 
3. Article 3 of the ‘Gay Propaganda’ law,153  amends a plethora of 
articles and statues in the Legal Code of the Russian Federation, 
most notably in Article 6.21 by providing a list of specific activities 
which are prohibited, 154  and divided between offenders with or 
without Russian citizenship.  However, this list is not fully 
enumerated.  
a. Section 6.21.1 (key words in bold print).  As translated into 
English, it proclaims the definition of violations and 
establishes fine amounts/punishments (for Russian citizens 
only):   
Promoting non-traditional sexual relations to minors 
by spreading information aimed at instilling in 
minors non-traditional sexual arrangements, the 
attractiveness of non-traditional sexual relations 
and/or a distorted view that society places an equal 
value on traditional and non-traditional sexual 
relations or propagating information on non-
traditional sexual relations making them appear 
interesting, provided that these activities do not 
involve criminal acts which are punishable under the 
law, will be punishable by the imposition of a fine 
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ranging from four thousand to five thousand rubles 
for individuals, from forty thousand to fifty thousand 
rubles for officials, from eight hundred thousand to 
one million rubles or suspension of operations for up 
to ninety days for legal entities, 
 
b. Section 6.21.2 (key words in bold print).  As translated into 
English, it proclaims a special type of violation with 
increased fine/punishment amounts (for Russian citizens 
only):   
Activities stipulated in section 1 of the present article 
carried out using the mass media and/or 
information-telecommunications channels 
(including the internet) provided that these 
activities do not involved criminal acts which are 
punishable under the law, will be punishable by the 
imposition of a fine ranging from fifty thousand to 
one hundred thousand rubles for individuals, from 
one hundred thousand to two hundred thousand 
rubles for officials, and one million rubles or 
suspension of operations for up to ninety days for 
legal entities. 
 
c. Section 6.21.3 (key words in bold print).  As translated into 
English, it proclaims the definition of violations and 
establishes fine/punishment amounts (for non-Russian 
citizens): 
Activities stipulated in section 1 of the present 
articles carried out by foreigners or stateless persons 
provided that these activities do not involve criminal 
acts which are punishable under the law, will be 
punishable by the imposition of a fine ranging from 
four thousand to five thousand rubles plus 
deportation from the Russian Federation or 
detention for up to fifty days plus deportation from 
the Russian Federation, 
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d. Section 6.21.4 (key words in bold print).  As translated into 
English, it proclaims a special type of violation with 
increased fine/punishment amounts (for non-Russian 
citizens):   
Activities stipulated in section 1 of the present article 
carried out by foreigners or stateless persons using 
the mass media and/or information-
telecommunications channels (including the 
internet) provided that these activities do not 
involve criminal acts which are punishable under the 
law, will be punishable by the imposition of a fine 
ranging from fifty thousand to one hundred 
thousand rubles plus deportation from the Russian 
Federation or detention for up to fifty days plus 
deportation from the Russian Federation. 
 
Thus, as written, the ‘Gay Propaganda’ Law seems quite innocuous and benign: 
however, the power resides in interpretation, as a full enumeration of specific 
activities that would be deemed illegal is absent.   
 
 
Ramifications, Rationale, and Reactions 
 
 
 
 The manifestation of accumulated power between the Church and State is 
evidenced in the verbiage and interpretation of this law.  However, the elucidation 
of the practical applications of the law is required in order to fully envision its 
severity.  In addition to these depictions of violations, the rationale from the Church 
and its leaders are paramount, as well as public opinion.  Admittedly, “[a] weapon 
is either offensive or defensive according to which end of it you are looking at,”155 
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so it is with caution, yet paramount, to elucidate the full range of complexities and 
perspectives from a wide range of legitimate sources. 
 The ‘Gay Propaganda’ Law is so vaguely written that specific violations are 
left up to the discretion of the local authorities.  The populace was asked in 2015, 
which activities could fall under the jurisdiction of this law.156  The polling data 
revealed some interesting statistics.  For each of the following activities, the 
recorded figure reflects the percentage of respondents that answered ‘probably yes’ 
or ‘definitely yes’: 
 80% - talk shows, television programs, articles on the lifestyles of sexual 
minorities 
 58% - personal communications with representatives of sexual minorities  
 67% - educational programs about the nature of homosexuality. 
 84% - meetings and rallies in defense of the rights of sexual minorities 
 79% - books and movies about same-sex relationships were violations. 
 87% - gay pride parades 
 81% - upbringing of a child with both parents being the same gender 
 85% - public displays of affections between homosexuals 
 
Thus, with such high percentages that reflect the overall opinion of the public, it is 
easy to conclude that public officials’ actions are representative of their constituents 
and warrant a close alliance with the Church.   
However, the accused violators of the ‘Gay Propaganda’ Law would 
virulently disagree.  Dmitry Isakov, age 24, from Kazan, was the first to be charged 
for violating this law.  His crime was holding a sign in protest, which read, “To be 
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gay and to love gays – is normal; to beat gays and to kill gays – is criminal.”157  
Elena Klimova, founder of the online website, “Children – 404,” was charged for 
referring teenagers who were struggling with their sexual minority identification to 
appropriate and non-judgmental counselors and advocates.158  She stated that “I 
fear that either there will be a judge who is not competent in this matter, or else 
there will be a signal from up high saying ‘this person must be found guilty,’” a 
reference to the ‘telephone’ laws in the Soviet Union when high ranking officials 
would mandate the preferred verdict to the lower-ranking judiciary before the trial 
had begun.  One of the most famous of all gay rights activists in Russia, Nikolai 
Alexeyev, better known for his legal case in the ECtHR which challenged the ban 
on Moscow gay pride parades,159 was arrested, alongside fellow activist Yaroslav 
Yevtushenko, outside a library in Arkhangelsk for holding a banner that read “Gay 
propaganda does not exist.  People do not become gay, people are born gay.”160 A 
newspaper editor (name unknown) was charged and fined in Khabarovsk for 
running a positive article about Aleksandr Yermoshkin, who had been assaulted 
and forced to resign from his place of employment because of his admitted non-
traditional sexuality.161  And the list proceeds indefinitely. 
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 However, the official stance from the Church is the foundation from which 
all of these public opinions seemingly derive.  In a document entitled the Basic 
Teaching on Human Dignity, Freedom and Rights, the Church proclaims: 
the rights of an individual should not be destructive for the unique way of 
life and traditions of the family and for various religious, national and social 
communities . . . [as] unity and inter-connection between civil and political, 
economic and social, individual and collective human rights can promote a 
harmonious order of societal life both on the national and international 
level.  The social value and effectiveness of the entire human rights system 
depend on the extent to which it helps to create conditions for personal 
growth in the God-given dignity and relates to the responsibility of a person 
for his actions before God and his neighbors.162 
 
Additionally, “[t]he Church calls upon people to restrain their egoistic desires for 
the sake of the common good,”163 “[h]uman rights should not contradict love for 
one’s homeland and neighbors,”164 “[t]he development and implementation of the 
human rights concept should be harmonized with the norms of morality, with the 
ethnical principle laid down by God in human nature and discernable in the voice 
of conscience,”165 [h]uman rights cannot be superior to the values of the spiritual 
world,”166 and, 
The weakness of the human rights institution lies in the fact that while 
defending the freedom of choice, it tends to increasingly ignore the moral 
dimension of life and the freedom from sin.  The social system should be 
guided by both freedoms, harmonizing their exercise in the public sphere.  
One of these freedoms cannot be defended while the other is neglected.  
Free adherence to goodness and the truth is impossible without the freedom 
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of choice, just as a free choice loses its value and meaning if it is made in 
favor of evil.167 
 
Likewise, in the Social Concept document of the Church where intersectionality of 
Church and State is publically acknowledged by proclaiming the unity of the 
“universal with the national,” little ambiguity remains concerning the intentions of 
the Church and how might they use this power and influence.168  These official 
ecclesiastical declarations are significantly clear to convey the perspective of the 
Church on human rights and the intersectionality of societal morality and the role 
of government. 
 Subsequently, the personal views of Kirill I, the current Patriarch of 
Moscow and All Russia, heightens the intensity of these perspectives.  He stated, 
that “Tradition is not something outmoded, unwieldy, cumbersome and basically 
useless.  Tradition is the main conduit facilitating the transmission of values 
between generations.  The attempts to raze everything to the ground – including the 
destruction of tradition – and then build a new world upon the debris usually lead 
to nothing good and brings a nation right to the threshold of spiritual 
catastrophe.”169  He also has been quoted, by declaring that the arrival of current 
Russian President Vladimir Putin is a “miracle of God.”170  He later became more 
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adamant by declaring, “We are seeing how efforts are being made in many 
prosperous countries to establish by law the person’s right to any choice, including 
the most sinful ones, those that contradict god’s word, the concept of holiness, the 
concept of god. . . . today we are [dealing with] a global heresy of worshipping the 
human, the new idolatry that removes god from human life.”171 Thus, from the 
selected quotations of rhetoric from Patriarch Kirill I, based upon the foundation of 
official Church documentation, the struggle for the heart and soul of Russia is a 
battle between the protection of Russian history and tradition and the unwanted 
influx of Western, individualistic morality. 
 As an examination of official Church rhetoric is crucial for a thorough 
examination of this imbroglio, the perspective from the current political regime, 
including from current President Vladimir Putin, is likewise critical, for an all-
encompassing understanding of this unique interrelationship.  Putin declared that 
“[a] policy is being conducted of putting on the same level multi-child families and 
single-sex partnerships, belief in God and belief in Satan.  The excesses of political 
correctness are leading to the point where people are talking seriously about 
registering parties whose goal is legalizing the propaganda of paedophilia;”172 and 
concerning the foreign athletes at the Sochi Olympic Games, he reassured them and 
the world that they [LGBTQIA] were welcome as long as they would “stay away 
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from the children.”173  The idea of conflating homosexuality to pedophilia is not a 
novel idea in regions that are striving to maintain traditional conservative values; 
nonetheless, it is a red herring.  He has also maintained that “[t]he revival of the 
Church’s unity is a crucial precondition for restoring the unity of the entire Russian 
world, which has always seen Orthodoxy as its spiritual foundation.”174   
 Subsequently, there have been many scholars and professionals who have 
articulated the significance of the Church and State interrelationship in modern 
Russia.  “The constitutional separation of church from state has not prevented the 
Orthodox Church from arrogating to itself some of the characteristics of an 
established church.  It has been able to do this, first, simply through the association 
of Orthodoxy with Russian culture,” 175  writes Michael Waller, a Professor 
Emeritus of politics and international relations.  Karina Pipiya, a sociologist from 
Levada Center stated that, “The authorities are constantly articulating the important 
role of Orthodoxy as one of the components of ‘special national identity,’ in 
contrast with Western values and patterns, and people willingly support this 
idea.”176  In 2015, the citizenry was surveyed about whether or not their value 
system and self-identity aligned with Western culture, with 91% responding by 
stating that Western culture was not important or absolutely does not align with 
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them,177 which is slightly highly than the percentages from 1993.  Likewise, when 
asked about faith and belief from 1991 to the present, the percentages confirm a 
‘special national identity’ component versus the assumed religiously divine 
characteristic of Orthodoxy.  The following percentages are significantly lower 
than the 80% of self-identified Orthodox believers nationwide:  (1) only 47% often 
or always hope and pray to God versus 25% percent in 1991; (2) a meager 37% 
believe in religious miracles, down from 49% ; (3) life after death garnered 40% 
for belief, again down from 51%; (4) barely half at 45% do not believe in the devil, 
down from 57%; and, (5) 43% do not believe in the existence of hell, down from 
56% in 1991.178  When questioned about the frequency of church attendance, only 
2% in 1991 responded that they attend church at least monthly, compared to a 
meager increase to 7% in 2008.179  The populace was asked about the benefits of 
religion to society as a whole, and the recorded percentages were 61% for positive 
benefits in 1990, and drastically dropping to 36% in 2015.  If the question was 
framed to benefit the individual, the percentages drop again, from 41% to 33%, 
respectfully.180  When asked if they would like to live in a country where religious 
values play an important role in social life, or where religion is a private matter 
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option and has no influence in social life, 65% answered affirmatively for the 
private matter and no influence in 2000, and down slightly to 57% in 2015.181  
Scholars have concluded that, “[t]he glue that holds together the alliance 
between Vladimir Putin and the ROC, and the one that more than any other explains 
their mutually-supporting actions, is their shared, sacralized vision of Russian 
national identity and exceptionalism.  Russia, according to this vision, is ‘neither 
Western nor Asian,’ but rather a unique society representing a set of values which 
are believed to be divinely inspired.”182  In January, 2016, 46% of the surveyed 
respondents answered that they would prefer a democratic system in Russia that 
was a “completely special kind that is appropriate to Russia’s national traditions 
and unique characteristics,” with another 19% wanting a system similar to the 
Soviet Union.183  The rapprochement with the Church is merely a ‘simulcra,’ or: 
the regime’s last desperate attempt to legitimate its rule as all other 
ideological strategies have already been tried and failed . . . In Russia, 
millions of Russians just pretend as if they were true Orthodox believers, 
the Orthodox Church behaves as if it were the nation’s paramount moral 
authority, and indisputable spiritual leader, and the Kremlin leadership 
treats the Church as if the latter were a powerful social institution whose 
help is instrumental in bringing about societal cohesion . . . For the 
overwhelming majority of Russians who claim they are Orthodox, the latter 
is just one of the markers of national and cultural identity . . . The “Orthodox 
ideology” acts as a substitute for a defunct communist one.184  
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These sentiments may appear to be harsh, but scholars and experts are forthright in 
their opinions of the current political and religious environment in Russia.  
Torbakov writes, that “[t]he Church’s subservience to the state is likely going to 
cost it dearly in terms of moral stature and prestige.  The state’s ruling elites’ casting 
of Orthodoxy as a “national religion” is counter-productive, if not outright 
dangerous in a multi-cultural and poly-confessional country.”185  
 There is, though, one prominent scholar, Irina Papkova, who elucidates the 
ineffectiveness of the Church and State alliance in Russia, which stands in subtle 
contrast to the majority opinion of Western scholarship.  Most of the scholarship, 
to date, emphasizes the juxtaposition between religious and cultural Orthodoxy, 
while she adds an additional dimension to the discourse, although with different 
definitional categories.  She delineates the Church in Russia as an ineffective and 
unorganized triad, divided between traditionalist, fundamentalist, and liberal 
factions.  In her opinion, traditionalists believe that Russia’s future lies in the 
“spiritual renaissance of its people, a process that cannot occur without the active 
involvement of the Orthodox Church,”186 and their viewpoints formed as a response 
to the “political, economic, and social crisis in which Russia found itself in the late 
1990s after nearly a decade of liberal, Western-inspired reforms.” 187  
Fundamentalists, per Papkova, have a “yearning for a Golden Age, apocalyptic and 
eschatological expectations, a return to original texts . . . and above all innovation 
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in religious practice.”188   Lastly, the liberals are a hybrid of the two previous 
descriptions, and are decidedly more open to the concepts of “capitalism, 
globalization, and the West,” in general.189  This lack of cohesion prevents the 
Church from organizing as a powerful block, and with the exception of the 1997 
Law, has been relatively ineffective, by not being able to accomplish its far-
reaching goals and political agenda for the country.  The environment has modified 
in favor of the Church with the arrival of the more conservative Patriarch Kirill I, 
but the premise of her three-dimensional bifurcation seamlessly aligns with the 
distinctions between religious and cultural Orthodoxy purported in this paper.  
Nonetheless, her insights are profound and worthy of further in depth exploration, 
as the scholarship on the causality and agenda of religious figures in the political 
realm are just beginning. 
 
Intersectionality of Church and State on Societal Issues 
 
 This paper has already established the interrelationship between the 
functioning mechanisms of the Church and State.  It is unsurprising that issues 
concerning the traditional family unit and non-traditional sexual relationships 
warrant an analogous approach, specifically concerning the formulation of the ‘Gay 
Propaganda’ law and the role of Russian Orthodoxy in society. 
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 There is a prominent link between Elena Mizulina of the State and 
Archpriest Dmitri Smirnov of the Church.  Mizulina,190 191the chief author of the 
‘Gay Propaganda’ Law, current Senator from the Omsk region and former 
Chairman of the Standing Commission on the Issues of Motherhood, Childhood 
and Women’s Rights in the Duma from 2000-2010, works very closely with 
Smirnov, 192  a top Orthodox priest in Moscow and head of the Patriarchal 
Commission on Family Matters, Protection of Motherhood and Childhood.  These 
two entities, one State affiliated and the other Church affiliated, work in tandem, as 
Smirnov stated that his “commission has worked closely with Mizulina's Duma 
committee on family policy” and “often advises” Mizulina, via institutional and 
financial links, as well as support in meetings, speeches, and policy advice.193  He 
also stated that “We will try to promote informational support and a higher level of 
legal culture [my emphasis] in the sphere of family relations . . . [and] to preach in 
all possible ways the Christian views on the family . . . which have now been largely 
lost.”194 
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 Mizulina has been actively involved in several controversial legislative 
proposals, with some having successfully been legislated and implemented.  She 
has proposed making Russian Orthodoxy the official state religion,195 and voiced 
concerns about legislation equating cohabitation as equal to formal marriage.196 
Additionally, she directly addressed the need for a traditional family with increased 
numbers of children to alleviate the steady decline in population numbers, by 
stating “The family is the highest value . . . Even if you compare it with the State . 
. . Because if there is no family, [there is] no State!”197 
 Evidence from Elena Mizulina, herself, exhibits one of the most striking 
examples of Church and State intersectionality.  Russian President Vladimir Putin 
and Patriarch Kirill I met recently at the Holy Mount Athos to mark the millennium 
anniversary of monasticism in Russia.  Mizulina stated,  
Я считаю этот визит очень важным для всего православного мира . . 
. светского и духовного . . . Это позволяет все глубже понять 
духовные основы российской государственности. И в очередной раз 
задуматься о необходимости сохранения русских традиций, о 
необходимости закрепления в российской Конституции положения об 
особой роли православия как основы национальной и культурной 
самобытности России.198 
 
I consider this visit to be very important for all of the Orthodox world . . . 
secular and spiritual . . . This allows everyone to more deeply understand 
the spiritual foundations of Russian nationhood.  And once again to reflect 
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on the need to preserve Russian traditions, on the need of consolidating in 
the Russian Constitution the provisions about the unique role of Orthodoxy 
as the basis of national and cultural distinctiveness of Russia. 
 
In sum, the evidence does more than suggest an unrestrained intersectionality 
between the State and Church in all areas of legislation, including within the realm 
of issues addressing the non-traditional sexual communities, which are deemed a 
manifestation of Western morality and are viewed as a direct threat to the Russian 
traditional family and survivability of the nation, of which, the ‘Gay Propaganda’ 
Law is only one exhibit of many. 
 
The Ineffectiveness of ‘Soft Power’ 
 
The European Union has expanded toward the east and absorbed many of 
the former Soviet satellite states, guided by the authority of the Copenhagen 
Criteria.  This protocol, named only because of the city in which it was agreed, 
“bound the applying governments to amend legislation.”199  Günter Verheugen, EU 
commissioner for enlargement, stated that “the next enlargement will . . . give us 
the opportunity to unite the European continent – on the basis of shared ideals and 
agreed common values.”200  He continued by stating that, “they hope to build a new 
model of cooperative democratic governance, one capable of abolishing internal 
armed conflict, securing economic prosperity, developing lasting legitimacy for 
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public institutions, and safeguarding individual’s freedoms.” 201   However, the 
European Union, along with its subsidiary judicial courts and agencies, does not 
have the authority to enforce any law on the individual member states, much less 
on non-member states, regardless of the holding rendered and regardless of the 
language in EU official documents.202  Although then-EU Commission President 
Romano Prodi proclaimed that the “equal treatment of minorities is a cornerstone 
of the new united Europe,”203 this rhetoric falls shallow without the power of 
enforceability and is fully dependent upon definitional agreements. 
Much has been discussed and argued over the structure and power of the 
European Union.  Some claim that it is a supranational ‘state,’ while others claim 
that it is merely an international ‘organization.’204  Under the auspices of a state, 
the EU should address a wide range of policy areas, have important roles within 
supranational organizations, directly elect the European Parliament, have a 
qualified majority voting in many areas, and possess the supremacy of EU law with 
direct effect.205  Under the auspices of an international organization, the EU would 
have no taxes, army, or police; a central role for the Council of Ministers and the 
European Council; the second-order character of EP elections; de facto unanimity 
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in many areas; and the member states would implement most policies.206  The 
prevalent opinion is that the EU exists in a political no-man’s land, somewhere 
between both concepts.  It doesn’t have enough power to mandate laws and 
protocols within the member states, regardless of pledged goals under the 
Copenhagen Criteria for potential membership, and too much power to be 
subsequently dismissed as just another organization.  Hence, without a strong 
enforcer of international law, any holdings are rhetorical in nature, at best, for non-
member states.    
To be brief, Europe’s own regional mechanism “may be able to prod, push, 
and plead with national governments to improve their conduct, but they cannot 
substitute for the responsibility of states to enforce their own laws.”207  As such, the 
plethora of constitutional violations and incongruities with international treaties in 
the Russian Federation will continue to only be subject to the rule of law, or lack 
thereof, in Russia. 
Hence, the community of non-traditional sexual minorities, as well as 
religious minorities, will continue to struggle for representation and equality before 
the law with little progress, just as they have done since December 25, 1991 when 
the Soviet Union collapsed, until alternative and more successful mechanisms are 
developed and infused into Russian society.  When particular entities rise in power, 
it is inevitable that it will manifest to the detriment of fringe populations in a non-
democratic society. 
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In closing, the potential of religion, however defined, to politically 
manipulate is evident as is reflected in the words of English theoretical physicist, 
Werner Heisenberg.  At the 1927 Solvay Conference, he discussed Einstein and 
Planck’s views on religion, stating:    
I cannot understand why we idle discussing religion.  If we are honest – and 
scientists have to be – we must admit that religion is a jumble of false 
assertions, with no basis in reality.  The very idea of God is a product of the 
human imagination.  It is quite understandable why primitive people, who 
were so much more exposed to the overpowering forces of nature than we 
are today, should have personified these forces in fear and trembling.  But 
nowadays, when we understand so many natural processes, we have no need 
for such solutions.  I can’t for the life of me see how the postulate of an 
Almighty God helps us in any way.  What I do see is that this assumption 
leads to such unproductive questions as why God allows so much misery 
and injustice, the exploitation of the poor by the rich and all the other horrors 
He might have prevented.  If religion is still being taught, it is by no means 
because its ideals still convince us, but simply because some of us want to 
keep the lower classes quiet.  Quiet people are much easier to govern than 
clamorous and dissatisfied ones.  They are also much easier to exploit.  
Religion is a kind of opium that allows a nation to lull itself into wishful 
dreams and so forget the injustices that are being perpetrated against the 
people; hence, the close alliance between those two great political forces, 
the State and the Church.  Both need the illusion that a kindly God rewards 
– in heaven if not on earth – all those who have not risen up against injustice, 
who have done their duty quietly and uncomplainingly.  That is precisely 
why the honest assertion that God is a mere product of the human 
imagination is branded as the worst of all mortal sins.208 209 
 
As long as religion is being used as a mechanism of State power, continued research 
and scholarship is required to attempt to unravel the exorbitant complexities of 
Church and State intersectionality, how it is formed and manifested, and the 
consequences thereof.  The 1997 Law provided the initial impetus to legally launch 
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a reestablishment of spiritual and moral authority by the Russian Orthodox Church, 
if only by the spirit of the law.  Upon the foundation of the 1997 Law, the Church 
has proceeded to secure a perceived pre-ordained position of authority and 
legitimacy, from which the State simultaneously benefits.  The evidence presented 
in this paper clearly highlights the incongruities of the paradoxical alliance between 
the Church and State in Russia. 
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CHAPTER IV: 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
  In conclusion, this paper purports that the 1997 Law was an apparent pivotal 
mechanism for the Church to begin its ascension to reestablish power and influence 
in the Russian Federation and is incongruent with established Russian law.  In 
addition, it is in direct violation of various international treaties, whether or not by 
the letter or spirit of the law, by providing the initial foundation upon which later 
preferential treatment and benefits to a privileged religion would be given in a 
multi-cultural and poly-confessional federative state.  This paper has demonstrated 
the perceived manifestation of ecclesiastical power via the support and passage of 
the ‘Gay Propaganda’ Law, which provides a legitimating foundation upon which 
to direct violence against the minority LGBTQIA communities.  Substantial polling 
data has been included and provided a linear trajectory of public opinion from the 
early 1990s to the present, proving that Russian Orthodoxy can be bifurcated into 
at least two different demographics:  religiously observant Orthodoxy and 
culturally/secularly self-identified Orthodoxy.   
The evidence put forth in this paper suggests that a genuine paradox exists 
in Russia between the Church and State.  Assuming that 80% of the population self-
identifies as Orthodox, that roughly 50% of the population believe to varying 
degrees in Church tenets, and that no more than 5% regularly attend church, there 
must be a non-religious role for Orthodoxy in the Russian Federation.  Peter 
Tatchell writes that, “What happened here shows the flawed and failed nature of 
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Russia’s transition to democracy . . . This isn’t just about protecting the rights of 
the gay and lesbian community [or Orthodox believers], it’s about the rights of all 
Russians to democratic freedoms.”210   
In sum, I ultimately conclude that the Church has not risen to or manifested 
power in the traditional sense via the 1997 Law or the ‘Gay Propaganda’ Law.  
However, it is the State that has manipulated the Church to further its own goals by 
utilizing a perceived source of legitimacy, as has been done so many times before 
throughout Soviet and Russian history.  Simultaneously, the Church has responded 
with poignant memories of persecution via the lens of self-preservation, while 
conveniently taking advantage of bureaucratic institutions to further its traditional 
agenda.  The State has made it clear, that while ‘spirituality’ remains an important 
component in Russia, in reality, the concept is “understood by state actors in ways 
that can hardly be called religious, let alone Orthodox.”211   
Unfortunately, time and patience are exponentially evaporating for 
substantive change, which is the emergence of prospective solutions for all of 
Russia’s citizens and an ultimate end to undemocratic and insolent principles.  
These traditions of Church and State intersectionality are, at best outdated and at 
worst untenable, as the Russian Federation officially proclaims its secularity while 
simultaneously governing as a de facto religious state.  
 
 
 
                                                          
210 Underwood, Alice E. M. "The Politics of Pride: The LGBT Movement and Post-Soviet 
Democracy." Harvard International Review 33, no. 1 (2011): 45. 
 
211 Papkova, 191. 
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TABLE 2: 
 
Relevant International Treaties of the Russian Federation 
 
 
 
Name of Treaty Signature Ratification Accession Entry into 
Force 
     
ICCPR 18/5/1968 16/10/1973 - - 
Optional Protocol to 
the ICCPR 
- - 1/10/1991 - 
Int’l Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights 
18/3/1968 16/10/1973 - - 
Convention on the 
Rights of the Child 
26/1/1990 16/8/1990 - - 
Freedom of 
Association and 
Protection of the Right 
to Organize 
Convention 
- 10/8/1956 - - 
ECHR aka European 
Convention for the 
Protection of Human 
Rights and 
Fundamental 
Freedoms 
28/2/1996 5/5/1998 - 5/5/1998 
ECHR Protocols 1-12 - - - 
All, no later 
than 
1/11/1998 
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Table 3: 
 
International Treaty Terminology 
 
 SIGNATURE Subject to Ratification, Acceptance or Approval 
o Where the signature is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, the signature 
does not establish the consent to be bound.  However, it is a means of authentication 
and expresses the willingness of the signatory state to continue the treaty-making 
process.  The signature qualifies the signatory state to proceed to ratification, 
acceptance or approval.  It also creates an obligation to refrain, in good faith, from acts 
that would defeat the object and the purpose of the treaty. 
o [Arts. 10 and 18, Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties 1969] 
 
 RATIFICATION 
o Ratification defines the international act whereby a state indicates its consent to be 
bound to a treaty if the parties intended to show their consent by such an act.  In the 
case of bilateral treaties, ratification is usually accomplished by exchanging the 
requisite instruments, while in the case of multilateral treaties the usual procedure is 
for the depositary to collect the ratifications of all states, keeping all parties informed 
of the situation.  The institution of ratification grants states the necessary time-frame 
to seek the required approval for the treaty on the domestic level and to enact the 
necessary legislation to give domestic effect to that treaty. 
o [Arts. 2 (1)(b), 14 (1) and 16, Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties 1969] 
 
 ACCESSION 
o “Accession” is the act whereby a state accepts the offer or the opportunity to become 
a party to a treaty already negotiated and signed by other states.  It has the same legal 
effect as ratification.  Accession usually occurs after the treaty has entered into force.  
The conditions under which accession may occur and the procedure involved depend 
on the provisions of the treaty.  A treaty might provide for the accession of all other 
states or for a limited and defined number of states.  In the absence of such a provision, 
accession can only occur where the negotiating states were agreed or subsequently 
agree on it in the case of the state in question. 
o Arts. 2 (1)(b) and 15, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969] 
 
 ENTRY INTO FORCE 
o Typically, the provisions of the treaty determine the date on which the treaty enters 
into force.  Where the treaty does not specify a date, there is a presumption that the 
treaty is intended to come into force as soon as all the negotiating states have consented 
to be bound by the treaty.  Bilateral treaties may provide for their entry into force on a 
particular date, upon the day of their last signature, upon exchange of the instruments 
of ratification or upon the exchange of notifications.  In cases where multilateral 
treaties are involved, it is common to provide for a fixed number of states to express 
their consent for entry into force.  Some treaties provide for additional conditions to 
be satisfied, e.g., by specifying that a certain category of states must be among the 
consenters.  The treaty may also provide for an additional time period to elapse after 
the required numbers of countries have expressed their consent or the conditions have 
been satisfied.  A treaty enters into force for those states which gave the required 
consent.  A treaty may also provide that, upon certain conditions have been met, it 
shall come into force provisionally. 
o Art. 24, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969] 
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